Just healthcare?:The moral failure of single-tier basic healthcare by Meadowcroft, John
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1093/jmp/jhu077
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Meadowcroft, J. (2015). Just healthcare?: The moral failure of single-tier basic healthcare. Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy, 40(2), 152-168. 10.1093/jmp/jhu077
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
1 
 
Just healthcare? The moral failure of single-tier basic healthcare 
 
 
John Meadowcroft 
 
Senior Lecturer in Public Policy 
Department of Political Economy 
King’s College London 
London 
UK 
 
Email: john.meadowcroft@kcl.ac.uk 
 
 
Published in Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Vol 40, No 2, 2015, pp. 152-
168. 
  
2 
 
Abstract: This article sets out the moral failure of single-tier basic healthcare. Single-tier 
basic healthcare has been advocated on the grounds that the provision of healthcare should 
be divorced from ability to pay and unequal access to basic healthcare is morally intolerable. 
However, single-tier basic healthcare encounters a host of catastrophic moral failings. Given 
the fact of human pluralism it is impossible to objectively define ‘basic’ healthcare. Attempts 
to provide single-tier healthcare therefore become political processes in which interest 
groups compete for control of scarce resources with the most privileged possessing an 
inherent advantage. The focus on outputs in arguments for single-tier provision neglects the 
question of justice between individuals when some people provide resources for others 
without reciprocal benefits. The principle that only healthcare that can be provided to 
everyone should be provided at all leads to a levelling-down problem in which advocates of 
single-tier provision must prefer a situation where some individuals are made worse-off 
without any individual being made better-off compared to plausible multi-tier alternatives. 
Contemporary single-tier systems require the exclusion of non-citizens, meaning that their 
universalism is a myth. In the light of these pathologies it is judged that multi-tier healthcare 
is morally required.  
 
Keywords: healthcare; ethics; egalitarianism; universalism; subjectivity; pluralism; exclusion; 
levelling-down; justice; need 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Single-tier basic healthcare describes the provision of one, universal standard of healthcare 
that is guaranteed to all as a right of citizenship. This may be provided either via direct state 
provision funded from compulsory taxation and provided free at the point of delivery, or via 
a system of national health insurance in which all citizens beyond a certain income level are 
required to contribute to health insurance and citizens below that level receive subsidized 
insurance.  
 
By contrast, multi-tier systems of healthcare involve the simultaneous provision of different 
‘quantities’ or ‘qualities’ of healthcare. This may occur via the existence of a market-based 
system of insurance, saving, and/or payment that leads to a plurality of provision so that 
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people with the same condition may receive different treatments depending upon their 
purchasing decisions (including ability to pay) in the marketplace. 
 
The healthcare systems of most contemporary European social democracies, such as 
Denmark, France, Italy and the UK, aspire to provide single-tier basic healthcare. The 
constitution of the UK National Health Service (NHS), for example, states: ‘The NHS provides 
a comprehensive service available to all… based on clinical need, not an individual’s ability 
to pay’ (Department of Health, 2012, 4). The German national health insurance scheme 
similarly aims to ensure that all German citizens receive the national standard of provision 
irrespective of individual income or wealth (Busse, Blumel and Stock, 2011).   
 
In most contemporary social democracies citizens with sufficient resources may purchase 
additional, alternative and/or superior healthcare via private providers. This may be 
politically controversial – in the UK, for example, cancer patients who made ‘co-payments’ 
to privately fund drug treatments not offered by the NHS were for a time denied further 
NHS treatment (Meadowcroft, 2008, 441) – but it is very rare for private ‘top-ups’ to be 
outlawed.  
 
This article is concerned with the preliminary question of whether the state should provide 
single-tier basic healthcare, rather than the secondary question of whether supplementary 
private provision is permitted. However, the issue of co-payments does speak to the 
question of what constitutes ‘basic’ healthcare that is a central concern of this article.  
 
Single-tier basic healthcare is usually advocated on moral grounds, with two linked 
arguments usually advanced in its support: (1) the provision of basic healthcare should be 
divorced from ability to pay; and (2) unequal access to basic healthcare is morally 
intolerable. It is argued that these two principles lead to a compelling moral case for the 
state to directly provide or guarantee a universal standard of basic healthcare. 
 
This article challenges the belief that single-tier basic healthcare is morally required. The 
standard ethical arguments for single-tier basic healthcare are elaborated in Section 2 
before the following three sections show why these arguments should be rejected. Section 
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3 will argue that it is impossible to objectively define ‘basic’ healthcare and Section 4 will 
show that consequently healthcare resource allocation becomes a political competition 
between different interest groups that generates questions of justice between individuals 
when some people are required to assume burdens without reciprocal benefits. Section 5 
will show that the egalitarian demands of single-tier healthcare create a levelling-down 
problem in which advocates of single-tier provision must prefer a situation where there is 
less total healthcare, less total well-being and some individuals are made worse-off without 
any person being made better-off than plausible multi-tier alternatives. Section 6 will draw 
upon the work of Hanson (2002) to argue that the widely-held intuition that healthcare is 
special is in reality a self-serving and in-group orientated remnant of human psychological 
evolution. The exclusion of non-citizens from single-tier healthcare in contemporary social 
democracies is evidence of the partial nature of the ‘universalism’ of such systems. A final 
concluding section will argue that the pathologies of single-tier basic healthcare mean that 
multi-tier healthcare is the most desirable model of healthcare provision.  
 
2. The ethical case for single-tier basic healthcare 
 
At the heart of the account of the moral superiority of single-tier basic healthcare is the 
notion that healthcare is special and this specialness means that, unlike other goods and 
services, healthcare should not be provided by the market. Informing this viewpoint is a 
powerful and widely-held intuition that inequalities that may be tolerable in respect of 
access to other goods and services are intolerable in the case of healthcare. 
 
Matthews (1998, 155-6), for example, has argued that while no one would consider it an 
injustice for chocolate cake to be provided by the market and thereby only be available to 
those people willing and/or able to pay for it, it is widely held that ‘an injustice is done when 
healthcare resources are allocated unequally’, so that ‘a health care system available to all 
free at the point of delivery is morally justified, indeed required’.  
 
Similarly, Daniels (1981, 146) has argued that there is a widely-held belief that ‘health care is 
“special,”’ and, ‘should be treated differently from other social goods’, so that, ‘even in 
societies in which people tolerate (and glorify) significant and pervasive inequalities in the 
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distribution of most social goods, many feel there are special reasons of justice for 
distributing health care more equally’.  
 
Empirical research by Lynch and Gollust (2010) has suggested that notions of blame or fault 
are important determinants of these popular intuitions about the justice or otherwise of 
different models of healthcare provision. In a survey of American citizens, Lynch and Gollust 
(2010, 870) found that 70 per cent of respondents believed that differential access to 
healthcare was unfair, but only 31 per cent of respondents thought differential life 
expectancy was unfair. Lynch and Gollust argued that this disparity reflected the popular 
perception that life expectancy was to a large extent determined by individual choices, so 
that a person may be held responsible for lowering their life expectancy through poor 
lifestyle choices, whereas access to healthcare was not judged a matter of personal 
responsibility.  
 
Market provision of healthcare is therefore rejected because it does not satisfy the criterion 
of equal access to all: ‘a market system denies access to medical treatment to those who are 
unable to pay for it… Under the market system, freedom of choice only really exists for 
those who have the ability to pay’ (Matthews, 1998, 156). 
 
Similarly, Stone has argued that the use of market forces in healthcare is morally intolerable 
because competitive pressures would allocate resources on the basis of ability to pay rather 
than clinical need: 
 
[M]arket ideology turns the health care system into a competition between the 
rich and the poor instead of an orderly distribution of medical care according to 
clinical need… market ideology is the biggest obstacle to health care equity 
because in market theory, distribution is not supposed to follow need. It is 
supposed to follow economic demand (Stone, 2005, 66).  
 
Single-tier basic healthcare is therefore advocated on the basis that the provision of basic 
healthcare should be divorced from ability to pay and unequal access to basic healthcare is 
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morally unacceptable. Hence, the requirements of equity are said to lead to a moral 
argument for single-tier basic healthcare.  
 
However, more work may still be required to show why this argument applies only to 
healthcare and not to the provision of other essential goods and services, such as food, 
clothing and housing. Many of the arguments for the provision of healthcare outside the 
market would seem to be arguments against markets per se, rather than arguments against 
markets in healthcare. 
 
Daniels (1981; 1985) has sought to establish the uniqueness of healthcare by utilising the 
Rawlsian idea of fair equality of opportunity. In Rawls’ (1999) theory of justice, in what has 
become known as ‘the difference principle’, Rawls argued that social and economic 
inequalities may be justified if they are to the benefit of the least advantaged and ‘attached 
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity’ (Rawls, 
1999, 302). Rawls argued that strict economic equality may not be to the benefit of the least 
advantaged because differential rewards may be necessary to incentivise the most 
productive members of society to maximise their contribution to the generation of wealth: 
‘each society has a redistribution policy which if pushed beyond a certain point weakens 
incentives and thereby lowers production’ (Rawls, 1999, 142).   
 
Rawls excluded healthcare from his analysis, however, stating that in his identification of the 
least advantaged he assumed, ‘that everyone has physical needs and psychological 
capabilities within the normal range, so that questions of health care and mental capacity 
do not arise’ (Rawls, 1999, 83-4). Daniels (1985, 43-8) has argued that Rawls’ exclusion of 
healthcare from his analysis was a simplification intended to enable him to establish a 
straightforward, idealized argument for distributive justice. Rawls’s simplifying assumption, 
Daniels has contended, did not preclude the extension of his analysis to more realistic and 
complex situations, such as the provision of healthcare, once the foundational principles 
had been established. Indeed, Daniels argued that the importance that Rawls attached to 
fair equality of opportunity within his theory of justice demanded that the analysis be 
extended to healthcare given its impact on life chances.  
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According to Daniels (1985, 42-3), healthcare is special because it is a paradigmatic example 
of a primary social good that must be present if people are to enjoy ‘species-typical normal 
functioning’. It is argued that, ‘health care promotes health (or normal functioning), and 
since health contributes to promoting opportunity, then health care protects opportunity’, 
so that, ‘If justice requires society to protect opportunity, then justice gives special 
importance to health care’ (Daniels, 2008, 29). As Stone (2005, 68) has put it, the 
specialness of healthcare comes from the fact that, ‘health is a pre-requisite to everything 
else that we value in life… people cannot earn, merit, or deserve if they cannot function in 
the first place’. 
 
It is argued, then, that healthcare is special because it impacts on life opportunities more 
profoundly than other goods or services. For this reason, it is claimed that unequal access to 
healthcare cannot be tolerated and universal provision of single-tier basic healthcare is 
morally required. On this basis it is said that popular intuitions about the specialness of 
healthcare can be cast into moral arguments that articulate the view that justice requires 
the provision of single-tier basic healthcare.  
 
3. What constitutes ‘basic’ healthcare? 
 
If it has been established that single-tier basic healthcare is a moral requirement, the 
question that then follows is what constitutes ‘basic’ healthcare? The advocates of single-
tier basic healthcare must draw a boundary separating basic healthcare and non-basic 
healthcare if the costs of such a system are to be controlled.  
 
The experience of the UK National Health Service is instructive here. On its foundation in 
1948, the NHS was designed to be free at the point of use with no explicit limit on the 
resources that could be consumed by an individual or by the system as a whole. The 
architects of the NHS believed that the cost of the system would decrease as the backlog of 
ill-health was cleared and preventative medicine and public health measures reduced future 
morbidity. The reality of the NHS proved much different, however. The cost of the NHS 
quickly became unmanageable leading to the introduction of charges for prescriptions and 
optical services within three years of its creation.  Despite the continuation of these charges 
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the net cost of the NHS has continued to rise inexorably, from three per cent of GDP in 1948 
to seven per cent of a significantly larger GDP sixty years later (Crisp, 2002; Culyer, 1976, 
Chapter 2; Malone and Rycroft-Malone, 1998; Meadowcroft, 2008). 
 
Without some restraint healthcare costs will rise relentlessly because chronic conditions can 
act as an unlimited drain on resources. As Brock (2001, 166-7) has noted, amongst 
individuals ‘with very severe cognitive and physical impairments who have a very low health 
related quality of life, there may be almost no end to the resources that might be devoted 
to them in the form of health care, medical research, and other supportive services’. 
Similarly, endless resources can conceivably be devoted to achieving relatively minor health 
gains for people who consider themselves to be in reasonably good health.  
 
Advocates of single-tier basic healthcare have argued that it is possible to establish a list of 
objective clinical needs that will be met by such a system. Daniels (1981; 1985) has argued 
that it is possible to make a distinction between needs that are objectively ascribable and 
objectively important and those that are only subjectively ascribable and subjectively 
important – only the former would be treated by a single-tier system. An individual’s need 
for root canal treatment, for example, is said to be objectively ascribable because it can be 
diagnosed by a trained professional. This need is also said to be objectively important 
because, again, a trained professional can attest to the pain and the complications that will 
follow if treatment is not provided. An individual’s need to revisit the neighbourhood of 
their childhood, on the other hand, is neither objectively ascribable nor objectively 
important. While the individual concerned will be aware of this need and will experience its 
urgency, these feelings are said to be purely subjective (Daniels, 1981; Daniels, 1985, 
Chapter 3).  
 
Daniels argued that this analysis can be developed to identify a category of objectively 
ascribable and objectively important needs that enable a person to ‘[maintain] a normal 
range of opportunities’ within a given society (Daniels, 1981, 154). On this basis, Daniels 
(1981, 157) argued that a dysfunctional nose ‘might warrant treatment as an illness’ if it was 
outside the normal species functions and anatomy, and thereby, one assumes, prevented an 
individual from accessing the normal range of opportunities. But it is argued that ‘deviation 
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of nasal anatomy from individual or social conceptions of beauty does not constitute 
disease’, so cosmetic correction would not be regarded as a health need to be met within a 
single-tier basic healthcare system.  
 
The advocates of single-tier basic healthcare assume that objective health needs can be 
identified and objective treatments accordingly prescribed, so that basic healthcare can be 
defined: ‘medicine is a science... This means that a standard of need can be arbitrated 
clearly and fairly. Each medical problem has a proper remedy; each person should get that 
remedy (or test, procedure, etc.) that is appropriate to his or her problem’ (Stone, 2005, 68-
9). 
 
In reality, however, it is impossible to establish a set of health needs that are objectively 
ascribable and objectively important. There are numerous different definitions of what 
constitutes a health need, ranging from a medical condition that expert clinical opinion 
decides merits treatment, to any state of health that falls below a particular standard of 
good health (Culyer, 1976, Chapter 2; Meadowcroft, 2005a).  
 
Moreover, what expert clinical opinion decides merits treatment is subject to enormous 
geographical, cultural and diachronic variation. For example, in Europe and North America 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, masturbation was considered by expert 
clinical opinion to be a life-threatening medical condition that demanded medical 
intervention, including, in extreme cases, surgery (Engelhardt, 1974; Stengers and van Neck, 
2001). Similarly, the existence and diagnosis of what was originally termed myalgic 
encephalomyelitis (ME), and is now known as chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), has been a 
matter of controversy within the medical profession of most developed countries for a 
number of decades (Evengård et al, 1999).   
 
What constitutes a general standard of good health is also not fixed. While there is 
evidence, for example in terms of rising life expectancy, of significant advances in health and 
well-being in contemporary developed societies, there is also counter-evidence that points 
to a decline in levels of health and well-being, such as the increase in the numbers of people 
receiving welfare payments because they are judged unable to work due to disability or ill-
10 
 
health. In the UK, for example, claimants of Disability Living Allowance have risen from just 
above one million people in 1992 to just under three million in 2008. While this threefold 
increase in welfare claimants on the grounds of disability raises a whole series of social 
policy questions beyond the scope of the present article, this rise does seem to reflect 
differing expectations as to what constitutes disability and the accepted standard of good 
health required for labour force participation.  
 
Likewise, Daniels’ (1981; 1985) example of nasal anatomy that does not meet popular 
concepts of beauty as a health need that is not objectively ascribable and not objectively 
important seems questionable given the evidence that physical appearance plays an 
important role in determining people’s life chances (for example Hamermesh, 2011). There 
would seem to be a strong argument on Daniels’ own terms for describing cosmetic 
interventions designed to make people look more beautiful as objectively ascribable and 
objectively important given the life opportunities that physical attractiveness may bestow. 
The point is not that Daniels is right or wrong in this particular instance, but that what 
constitutes a health need requiring clinical intervention is inherently subjective.  
 
Not only is there no consensus as to what constitutes medical need, or the urgency of 
different medical needs, but, as Shapiro (2007, 136) has pointed out, different individuals 
will wish to make different trade-offs between healthcare and alternative uses of resources: 
 
Those who are more risk averse will likely devote more resources and time to 
health care and their relationship with their health-care providers; those who are 
less risk averse are less likely to do so. All of these differences would seem to imply 
a role for widespread choice in the health-care system… 
 
What follows is that there is no objectively correct trade-off to be made between healthcare 
and other possible uses of scarce resources. Rather, there are a myriad of possible trade-
offs that reflect different individual approaches to risk and different individual preferences 
for various ends, wants and needs.  
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The contention that health needs can be objectively determined by expert opinion, or some 
other deliberative process, is a fundamental misconception. In reality, as Engelhardt (1996, 
190) has put it, ‘medical facts… are not timeless truths, but data given through the 
formative expectations of our history and culture. Recognizing a state of affairs as heart 
disease, cancer, depression, homosexuality, or tuberculosis is a rich and complex process’. 
The case for single-tier provision of basic healthcare requires denial of the pluralism and 
subjectivity of human experience and how this plays out in the realm of health and well-
being.   
 
A fundamental and insurmountable problem for single-tier basic healthcare is that it is 
impossible to objectively establish what constitutes basic healthcare. However, those 
managing the single-tier healthcare systems of contemporary social democracies must 
attempt to make such judgements if such systems are to operate and control costs. 
Examination of the real world operation of such processes further undermines the case for 
single-tier basic healthcare.  
 
4. The provision of ‘basic’ healthcare and justice between individuals 
 
Those managing the single-tier healthcare systems of contemporary social democracies 
must make central, deliberative decisions about what conditions will be treated and what 
treatments will be provided despite the fact that objectively ascribable and objectively 
important health needs cannot be established. In the UK, for example, the National Institute 
of Clinical Excellence (NICE) issues guidelines on what treatments the NHS will fund for 
different conditions using basic cost-effectiveness analysis (Meadowcroft, 2008; Rawlins and 
Culyer, 2004). 
 
In the absence of an objective basis for such decision-making, resource allocation within 
such a system becomes a political process in which different interest groups compete for 
control of scarce resources. Those groups that are able to effectively mobilise to capture the 
deliberative process will be able to secure substantial resources for the treatment of 
particular conditions, whereas those groups unable to mobilise so effectively will receive 
relatively limited resources.  
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This is one explanation of why in the UK NHS, for example, the treatment of some 
conditions, such as Parkinson’s Disease, may be judged world-leading, whereas the 
treatment of others, such as lung cancer, produces survival rates among the lowest in the 
developed world. An important factor in the relative allocation of resources to Parkinson’s 
care and lung cancer treatment is the different socio-economic profiles of those who suffer 
from the two conditions. Resource allocation via the political process privileges the 
demands of those with the relevant economic, social and/or cultural resources 
(Meadowcroft, 2008).  
 
Even when questions of resource allocation within a single-tier basic healthcare system are 
addressed in the theoretical literature, the problem of justice between different groups 
arises. Daniels’ (1981; 1985) privileging of life opportunities in his argument for healthcare 
exceptionalism, for example, leads to the conclusion that greater importance should be 
attached to the health needs of the young relative to the health needs of the old. This raises 
particular difficulties given that a large proportion of healthcare expenditure is used to 
alleviate pain and suffering in the final months of life and to postpone death as long as 
possible. As Segall has pointed out, it is hard to see how such treatment can be judged 
special in terms of Daniels’ criterion of achieving fair equality of opportunity: 
 
Most patients treated by health care systems are individuals in the twilight of their 
lives. Furthermore, it is also the case that the bulk of health care resources are 
spent on these elderly patients… Health care in that case cannot be said to provide 
opportunity, equal or otherwise, to pursue life plans (Segall, 2007, 347-8). 
 
Indeed, Daniels’ (1985, 88) has gone so far as to argue that ‘an age-relative opportunity 
range’ might be used by ‘prudent planners’ to assess the level of healthcare to be provided 
to the elderly relative to that provided to the young. This would mean that people above a 
certain age would be denied life saving and other treatments (unless they had recourse to 
private finance to fund those treatments).  
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The notion that ‘prudent planners’ will dispassionately and omnisciently decide who should 
and should not receive healthcare presents an extremely naïve view of the practical reality 
of deliberative rationing in single-tier healthcare systems described earlier in this section. 
 
Moreover, within Daniels’ model it will be possible for a citizen to make no demands on a 
national healthcare system throughout their working life and then to be denied treatment in 
their old age. Such an individual will have contributed in tax to the provision of other 
people’s healthcare, but will receive no provision in return. It is difficult to see that this state 
of affairs is just.  
 
This is a particularly striking example of a more general problem faced by moral theories 
that focus on outputs but do not take into account the inputs required to produce those 
outcomes. Proposals for single-tier basic healthcare like those set out by Daniels seem to 
assume that the resources required to provide healthcare are manna from heaven that have 
fallen unowned from the sky, when in reality resources are created through the labour of 
individual men and women and such wealth creation in turn creates entitlements. If a 
particular individual or group creates resources that are used to provide healthcare to 
others, then questions regarding the justice of the relationship between producers and 
consumers must arise.      
 
In ethical evaluation of questions of public finance like the provision of national systems of 
healthcare it is necessary to examine the balance-sheets of individual men and women in 
order to appreciate the individual contributions made and the individual disbursements 
received. Macro-analysis of aggregate statistics, such as national expenditure on healthcare, 
inevitably fails to take into account the net contributions/receipts of particular individuals. 
As Buchanan (1958, 33) has written in the context of aggregate analyses of public debt 
liabilities: 
 
[T]he effect on the national balance sheet is operationally irrelevant… the nation 
or community is not a sentient being, and decisions are not made in any 
superindividual or organic way. Individuals and families are the entities whose 
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balance sheets must be examined if the effects on social decisions are to be 
determined. 
 
It is necessary to examine the distribution of benefits and burdens between individuals in 
order to arrive at an accurate assessment of the justice of a particular system of healthcare 
provision. A healthcare system in which particular individuals are required to labour to fund 
the treatment of others who do not bear similar burdens, faces important questions 
regarding the justice of such arrangements. There may be particular circumstances in which 
such arrangements are perfectly just, for example if some people volunteer to provide for 
others, but work is required to bring forward such justifications that has not been done by 
the advocates of single-tier basic healthcare.  
 
5. Egalitarianism and the levelling-down problem in healthcare provision 
 
As set out in Section 2 above, the underlying principle of single-tier basic healthcare is that 
everyone has access to identical provision. It is deemed to be morally wrong for one person 
to receive basic care that is not available to others – for example, because they are unable 
to pay for it. It follows from this position that (aside perhaps from experimental testing of 
new drugs or procedures) a particular healthcare treatment or standard should only be 
made available if it can be provided to all; a treatment that cannot be provided universally 
should not be made available to anyone.   
 
As such, single-tier basic healthcare would seem to fall foul of Parfit’s (1991; 1997) 
‘levelling-down’ objection to egalitarianism. This objection may be illustrated with the 
formal example of the following two distributions of well-being (1) and (2) between three 
hypothetical people A, B and C, shown in Figure 1 below (setting aside the question of 
whether well-being really can be measured in such a precise way).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Distribution (1) is the more equal of the two distributions, and therefore the distribution 
that egalitarians would logically prefer, but (2) has the highest overall well-being and A, the 
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person worse-off in both distributions, is better-off in absolute terms (though not in relative 
terms) in (2). The problem that Parfit identified is that the egalitarian must prefer the 
distribution of well-being in which everyone has less welfare, including the person at the 
bottom of the scale. This would seem to cast egalitarianism into the realm of the irrational 
and the welfare-reducing.  
 
When applied to the provision of healthcare, the levelling-down problem would seem to be 
particularly acute. If the two distributions in Figure 1 are assumed to show the only two 
possible allocations of access to healthcare (again, assuming such access could be quantified 
in this way), then, again, the egalitarian must prefer the more equal distribution (1), even 
though (2) has the highest overall healthcare provision and A, the person worse-off in both 
distributions, receives access to superior healthcare in (2).  
 
Moreover, the advocate of equal access to healthcare would also seem to prefer a 
distribution of healthcare resources in which some people are denied treatment that could 
be made available to them, but that resources would not permit to be made available to all. 
This problem is illustrated in Figure 2 below which shows the formal example of two 
distributions of healthcare resources (3) and (4) between three hypothetical people D, E and 
F. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Here, the health egalitarian must prefer equal distribution (3) over unequal (4), even though 
individuals E and F will be denied access to treatment that they would have received in the 
latter distribution, because resources do not permit that level of treatment to be extended 
to D also.  
 
A moral commitment to the principle that no one should be denied access to healthcare 
that is available to others inevitably leads to support for situations in which some people are 
denied treatment with no benefit flowing to others as a result of that denial.  It would seem 
that the advocate of single-tier healthcare must take a position that is irrational and 
welfare-reducing in that it requires preference for a situation in which there is less total 
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healthcare, less total well-being and some individuals are made worse-off without any 
individual being made better-off as a consequence.  
 
The problems posed for egalitarianism by the levelling-down objection led Parfit (1991; 
1997) to adopt what he termed ‘the priority view’ as an alternative moral standpoint. This is 
the view that ‘it is morally more important to benefit the people who are worse off’ than to 
pursue strict equality of outcome or input (Parfit, 1991, 103). Giving priority to those in 
most need is judged more valuable than equality per se. The most influential prioritarian 
argument is that set out in Rawls’ (1999) theory of justice, in which, as noted above, Rawls’ 
difference principle stated that inequalities may be justified if they are to the benefit of the 
least advantaged members of society.  
 
Prioritarianism raises some general philosophical questions, such as which group should be 
prioritised and on what basis,1 but in the context of the present article the most relevant 
implication is that, unlike egalitarianism, prioritarianism does not require single-tier basic 
healthcare. On the contrary, as Shapiro (2007) and Pennington (2011) have argued, if we 
believe that multi-tier healthcare leads to a superior quality of provision for all than single-
tier healthcare then a prioritarian like Rawls should support such a system on ethical 
grounds. The least advantaged would clearly benefit from an unequal system that delivered 
a higher quality of healthcare to all compared to one that provided equal access to 
universally inferior healthcare. 
 
6. Moral intuition, healthcare exceptionalism and exclusion 
 
An important part of the case for single-tier basic healthcare set out in Section 2 is the claim 
that there is a common moral intuition that healthcare is special and therefore should not 
be subject to market forces. The notion that moral intuitions should be uncritically 
translated into public policy is, however, problematic.  
 
                                                          
1 Nozick’s (1974, 194-5) critique of Rawls’ prioritising of the least advantage is probably the most important 
critique of Rawls’s prioritarianism.  
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Hanson (2002) has argued that there are often good reasons to be sceptical towards widely-
held moral intuitions, rather than use them as the basis for moral theories that may 
ultimately inform public policy. Many moral intuitions reflect common biases in the non-
scientific analysis of empirical data and/or are remnants of human psychological evolution 
which ‘has left us largely unaware of how self-serving and in-group-orientated (i.e. favouring 
our own family, tribe, or ethnicity) the functions performed by those behaviours and 
intuitions were’ (Hanson, 2002, 154). 
 
According to Hanson (2002), the belief that healthcare is special may be an example of an 
intuition that appears to be other-regarding but is in fact self-serving. Hanson notes that the 
common concern for the health of others that is translated into political advocacy of single-
tier basic healthcare does not extend to other comparable problems. There are charities 
devoted to practically every medical condition, but almost none devoted to other life crises, 
‘such as divorce, falling out of love, unemployment, failing in one’s career, losing a friend, 
and so on’ (Hanson, 2002, 165).  
 
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, this unique interest in the health of 
others, but not in other aspects of their well-being, is most logically explained by the 
personal benefits likely to be derived from other people’s health. Hanson (2002) has argued 
that in the small groups within which humans evolved ensuring that one was surrounded by 
high status individuals was crucial to personal survival. In these small groups, high status 
was positively linked to good health, which meant that each individual had a powerful 
interest in the health of other members of their immediate group, but not in other aspects 
of their well-being, nor in the health of those outside the group. According to Hanson, it is 
these self-interested, in-group concerns that are the source of the common contemporary 
intuition that healthcare is special.  
 
In the light of Hanson’s analysis it is surely significant that healthcare exceptionalism is 
almost always applied at the national, but not the international, level.  Although arguments 
for healthcare exceptionalism are framed in terms of the principle that no one should be 
denied access to healthcare on the basis of ability to pay, such as Matthews’ (1998, 156) 
claim ‘that an injustice is done when health care resources are allocated unequally, between 
18 
 
different income groups or between different geographical areas’, the actual operation of 
single-tier basic healthcare systems is at odds with this normative position. Access to 
healthcare within contemporary social democracies is in fact only extended to citizens of 
these societies.  
 
Hence, the legislation underpinning the UK NHS makes provisions for the UK government to 
charge non-citizens for the use of NHS services. As the UK Department of Health website 
advises:  
 
If you are not ordinarily resident or exempt under the regulations, charges will 
apply for any hospital treatment you receive and cannot be waived. If this is the 
case you are strongly advised to take out private healthcare insurance that would 
cover you for the length of time you are in the UK.  There is no facility to purchase 
healthcare insurance from the NHS therefore any necessary insurance must be 
organised privately.2  
 
Access to state provided healthcare in contemporary social democracies, then, is not 
universal. The principle of universality only extends to citizens and those who temporarily 
meet the relevant residency requirements. People resident in these countries on short-term 
entry visas who do not meet the requirements of citizenship, for example, are excluded 
from treatment.  
 
Moreover, millions of poor and needy people who happen to live in other parts of the world 
are excluded from entry to contemporary social democracies and are thereby excluded from 
access to these services. These millions of people are excluded from these healthcare 
systems because it would be financially impossible to grant them access and maintain the 
quality of care that the citizens of contemporary social democracies demand.  
 
The exclusion of non-residents might be thought justifiable on the basis that they have not 
contributed to the provision of the relevant services, but, as shown above, singe-tier basic 
healthcare is justified on the basis of universal moral principles, rather than on the basis of 
                                                          
2 http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Healthcare/Entitlementsandcharges/OverseasVisitors/Browsable/DH_074400 
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the financial contribution made by particular individuals or groups; a citizen of a social 
democratic state who did not work a single day in their life and therefore did not contribute 
a penny of income tax would remain entitled to full access to healthcare.  
 
This exposes the fact that the social democratic principle of inclusion is in fact a principle of 
exclusion. The quality of care provided by these healthcare systems can only be maintained 
if non-residents are excluded. This may be practically expedient but it should be morally 
troubling for advocates of these ‘universal’ systems. It is not clear on what basis there is a 
moral difference between a healthcare system that provides differential access to people 
within a single polity and a healthcare system that provides differential access to people 
across polities. The only substantive difference would seem to be the boundaries via which 
people are excluded.  
 
In this respect the supposedly-universal healthcare systems of contemporary social 
democracies are an example of the insider-outsider division characteristic of contemporary 
social democratic welfare states. Those who are citizens of these countries have allocated 
themselves benefits that can only be maintained if less fortunate others are excluded. 
Curiously, this does not inhibit advocates of these systems from shamelessly employing 
moral arguments that appeal to principles of equality and universalism.  
 
The fact that healthcare exceptionalism is only applied at the national level would seem to 
support Hanson’s claim that the moral intuition that health is special reflects a self-serving 
and in-group-orientated preference. It is an intuition that should be critically interrogated 
rather than uncritically accepted.  
 
7. Conclusion: the moral necessity of multi-tier healthcare 
 
This article has set out the moral failure of single-tier basic healthcare. It has shown that it is 
impossible to objectively define ‘basic’ healthcare. Consequently, single-tier healthcare 
systems engender a political process in which different groups compete to have their 
desired treatments classified as ‘basic’ healthcare. Those groups with superior resources for 
lobbying possess an inbuilt advantage in this process. The political allocation of resources to 
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different healthcare treatments also generates questions of justice between individuals 
when some people are required to assume burdens without reciprocal benefits; it is 
erroneous to examine aggregate healthcare outcomes without considering the 
contributions and receipts of particular individuals and families in the production and 
consumption of healthcare.  
 
It was also shown that the egalitarian demands of single-tier healthcare create a levelling-
down problem where a situation in which there is less total healthcare, less total well-being 
and some individuals are made worse-off without any individual being made better-off must 
be preferred to plausible multi-tier alternatives. Finally, it was argued that the widely-held 
intuition that healthcare is special is in reality a self-serving and in-group orientated 
remnant of human psychological evolution. The ‘universal’ healthcare systems of 
contemporary social democracies only operate via the exclusion of non-citizens unfortunate 
enough to born outside of these particular polities. The moral basis for the exclusion of 
those individuals is unclear.  
 
The catastrophic ethical failings of single-tier basic healthcare lead to the conclusion that 
multi-tier healthcare is morally required. There is no one correct method to deliver multi-
tier healthcare. As Shapiro (2007, Chapters 3 and 4) has discussed at length, multi-tier 
healthcare can be delivered via a market for private health insurance in which a plurality of 
suppliers offer a variety of different insurance packages. As in other insurance markets, 
individuals and groups (for example, the employees of a particular organisation) may then 
choose the level and type insurance best suited to their personal preferences. Multi-tier 
healthcare can also be provided by charging for medical services, as is presently the case in 
the provision of cosmetic surgery, dental care and optical services in most countries. 
Charges may be met by saving plans or (where appropriate) via insurance services.  
 
There is, then, no blueprint for how multi-tier healthcare should be delivered. Instead, a 
process of discovery should be set in motion towards a future that must ultimately be 
unknown and unknowable.  
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A multi-tier healthcare system reflects the inherently personal and subjective nature of 
health needs and the diverse range of possible treatments that may be provided in response 
to those needs. To suggest that a panel of experts (or some other deliberative process) can 
categorise some health needs as objectively ascribable and objectively important is to deny 
fundamental truths about the plurality of human ends because those truths do not fit a pre-
determined view of how healthcare should be organised. 
 
A multi-tier healthcare system enables some people to receive healthcare that cannot yet 
be provided universally. This does mean that the wealthy will be able to pay for treatments 
not presently available to those without similar resources – but given that these treatments 
would not be available to anyone in a single-tier system they represent a positive-sum gain 
compared to single-tier healthcare.  
 
Moreover, by paying for treatments not presently affordable to all, the rich fund the 
development of treatments that will eventually be provided at a cost that is widely 
affordable. Just as a small number of wealthy pioneers first bought televisions, personal 
computers and mobile phones and by so doing demonstrated the demand for these 
products and funded their eventual production at much lower cost, multi-tier healthcare 
allows the same principle of experimentation, learning and speculative investment to 
operate in healthcare (Meadowcroft, 2005b, 75-77).  
 
Advocates of single-tier basic healthcare have long assumed the ethical high ground, yet 
their arguments have failed to address the numerous moral problems inherent to any 
attempt to provide single-tier basic healthcare. This article has set out those moral problems 
and argued that the catastrophic moral failings of single-tier basic healthcare can only be 
avoided by the provision of multi-tier healthcare. It is multi-tier healthcare, not single-tier 
healthcare, that provides a just system of healthcare provision.  
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Figure 1: Two distributions of well-being among three people 
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Source: Adapted from Brock (2002, 364) 
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Figure 2: Two distributions of healthcare resources among three people 
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